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## **Rapport sur la mission effectuée au Département de Philosophie de l'Université de Stockholm (Suède), le 20 novembre 2009.**

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**Objet :** conférence donné dans le cadre du Séminaire de Logique & Langage du Département de Philosophie, le 20 novembre 2009.

**Site du séminaire :** <http://people.su.se/~ppagin/lalprg.html>

### **Déroulement de la mission**

#### ***Résumé de la communication « Dialogical semantics – critical and comparative remarks » :***

Paul Lorenzen [3,4] proposed a ‘dialogical foundation’ for logic, which was further developed by Kuno Lorenz [1,2]. The idea is that logic is in need of justification. The justification of inference rules and logical validities would stem from the meaning of logical constants, which – crucially – would be determined by the sorts of activities by means of which formulas involving those constants can be processed in dialogues: the activities of attack and defense.

The validity of formula  $A$  means the existence of a winning strategy in the dialogue about  $A$  for the player who initially agreed to defend  $A$ . By varying the specific rules of dialogues the contrast between intuitionistic and classical logic can be characterized.

The conceptual novelty of the dialogical approach lies in the claim that meaning does not belong to the same level with the notions such as validity, truth and proof (it is not a ‘strategic notion,’ so to say), but emerges already at the ‘play level,’ as soon as the rules for making moves in dialogues are determined (i.e., as soon as it is told how to defend and attack formulas of the relevant forms).

In the talk I will discuss whether it is correct to think of dialogical semantics as a genuine alternative to either proof-conditional or model-theoretic semantics. I consider also Hintikka’s GTS, which offers a semantics that is at the same time truth-conditional (like model-theoretic semantics) and employs the notion of strategy (which is related to the notion of truth like the notion of proof is related to notion of being provable).

- [1] K. Lorenz (1961): *Arithmetik und Logik als Spiele*. Ph.D. thesis, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, 1961.
- [2] K. Lorenz (1967): “Dialogspiele als semantische Grundlage von Logikkalkülen.” *Archiv für mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung* 11, 32-55 & 73-100, 1967.
- [3] P. Lorenzen (1960): “Logik und Agon,” in *Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia* (Venezia, 1958), 187-194, Sansoni.
- [4] P. Lorenzen (1961): “Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium,” in *Infinistic Methods*, no ed. given, 193-200, Pergamon Press.

#### ***Des autres aspects de la mission :***

J’avais l’occasion de rencontrer des collègues travaillant sur des thèmes liés à mes intérêts scientifiques.