

NOM Prénom : OSBORNE Nicolas

Nature de la mission (séjour de recherche, participation à un colloque...): Participation à la *Leuven Kant Conference* (Colloque sur deux jours).

Lieu et date : Université Catholique de Leuven (Belgique) les 29 et 30 mai 2014

Frais de mission attribués par le laboratoire : 204€80 (Laboratoire + ED)

Description de la mission (par ex. résumé de l'intervention proposée/activités de recherche réalisées au cours de la mission...):

Titre de la communication: 'Kant on Modalities and Justification'

Kant's explanations of modalities of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*KrV*, A 74-76/B 99-101) support two kinds of interpretations. Either modalities of judgment are related to the situation of the proposition in a conditional syllogism (e.g. Leech, 2012), or modalities of judgment are attitudes toward the propositional content of the judgment (Wilson, 1978 and Matthey, 1986). I claim that the first way of interpreting Kant's modalities of judgment is misleading and that the second way is not precise enough. I will defend that modalities of judgment are rather attitudes toward the justification of the propositional content of the judgment. Thus I will argue that this is the only way of interpreting Kant's modalities of judgment that makes it possible to correctly understand the progression of the modalities of judgment which Kant stated in the end of his remark after the table of Judgment (*KrV*, A 76/B 101) and the connection between modalities of judgment and modalities of assent which he stated for example in the *Jäsche Logik* (AA, 9:66).

In my presentation, firstly I will defend my interpretation of modalities of judgment and secondly I will draw the conclusions from my interpretation about the progression of modalities of judgment. In order to defend my claim, I will show how the Kantian conception of modalities of judgment was constructed with and against Crusius' one in his *Weg zur Gewißheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis*. Crusius was one of the few philosophers who proposed considerations about modalities in logic. Kant transforms the conception of modalities of judgment with his new conception of judgment, namely the conception that a judgment is not merely "the representation of a relation between two concepts", but "nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the **objective** unity of apperception" (*KrV*, B 141). This new conception of judgment leads Kant to conceive modalities of judgment as attitudes toward the objectivity of the judgment, that is the justification of the proposition expressed in the judgment. A problematic judgment is a judgment whose justification is rated

as possible, an assertoric judgment is a judgment whose justification is rated as real and an apodictic judgment is a judgment whose justification is rated as necessary. Hence, the progression of the modalities of judgment is a progression in the justification of the proposition expressed in the judgment.

Here, the problem is to understand how this progression is possible. How a problematic judgment becomes assertoric? And how an assertoric judgment becomes apodictic? Since the question is the one of the justification, I claim that the answer to this question is to be found in the discussion of the distinction between conviction and persuasion (*KrV*, A 820/B 848 ff.). Here, I claim that the condition of the possibility of the progression appears to be a question of argumentation, that is a question of communication, agreement and disagreement, through “the experiment the one makes on the understanding of others” (*KrV*, A 821/B 849).

Bénéfice de la mission (pour le chercheur/l’enseignant-chercheur, pour le laboratoire) :

Ma présentation a reçu un bon accueil et n'a pas soulevé d'objections, confirmant ainsi la solidité de mon argumentation. La discussion qui a suivi ma présentation a été des plus intéressantes, m'indiquant quelques pistes de travail pour développer mon travail sur cette question.

D'autre part, ce colloque n'étant pas thématique, j'ai pu écouter des conférences de grande qualité sur des thèmes très variés de la philosophie de Kant, aussi bien théorique que pratique.